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INTRODUCTION
The article Israel, Palestine, and the ICC by Daniel Benoliel and
Ronen Perry, published in Volume 32 of the Michigan Journal of Inter-
national Law, makes a case against a possible assertion of jurisdiction by
the International Criminal Court over war crimes that may have been
committed by persons on either side of the 2008-2009 war in Gaza.' Be-
noliel and Perry argue that the International Criminal Court is powerless
to investigate or to prosecute such war crimes, despite the strong possi-
bility that such crimes were committed. Concern over such possible
crimes has been widely expressed at the international level, including a
study produced by a panel convened by the Human Rights Council of the
United Nations.2
In the abstract, Benoliel and Perry could be correct. The fact of the
commission of war crimes does not automatically create jurisdiction
over them in the International Criminal Court. The Rome Statute of the
President's Club Professor in Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State Univer-
sity. A.B., Harvard University; M.A. Harvard University; LL.B, Harvard University.
1. Daniel Benoliel & Ronen Perry, Israel, Palestine, and the ICC, 32 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 73 (2010).
2. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on
the Gaza Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009).
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International Criminal Court, the court's founding treaty, provides for
jurisdiction only in a limited way, broadly requiring some connection to
a state that is party to the Rome Statute.' But even absent any connection
to a state party, jurisdiction also results if the state in whose territory a
war crime was committed confers jurisdiction upon the court by lodging
a declaration to that effect with the court's registrar.'
Neither Israel nor Palestine is a party to the Rome Statute.! However,
Palestine lodged a declaration conferring upon the International Criminal
Court jurisdiction over war crimes committed in the territory of Pales-
tine.6 Benoliel and Perry dispute the effectiveness of that declaration by
asserting that Palestine is not a state.! A substantial segment of their ar-
gument is in the form of a reply to my position to the contrary, as
published in the Rutgers Law Record.! Benoliel and Perry recount the
principal points of my argument and give their arguments to the contrary.
My article was quite brief and made the case for Palestine's
statehood only in a preliminary fashion. A fuller analysis is found in my
recent Cambridge University Press book on Palestinian statehood.' In
that book, I explain Palestine's legal status in detail, beginning with the
constitution of Palestine as a state in the League of Nations era and
following through with the acceptance of Palestine as a state by the
contemporary international community. After World War I, the Arab
territories of the Turkish empire were taken from it and became states of
their own, subject to temporary administration by either France or
Britain. Palestine was administered by Britain until it withdrew in 1948,
whereupon part of its territory was taken by a new state, Israel, another
part (the Gaza Strip) was administered as Palestinian territory by Egypt,
and still another part (the West Bank of the Jordan River) was
provisionally merged into Jordan, which nonetheless recognized an
underlying Palestinian sovereignty. In recent decades, the international
3. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3.
4. Id. art. 12(3).
5. ICC-The States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/
states+parties/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2011).
6. Palestinian Nat'l Auth., Ministry of Justice, Office of the Minister, Declaration
Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, Jan. 21, 2009, available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/74EEE201-OFED-4481-95D4-
C8071087102C/279777/20090122PalestineianDeclaration2.pdf.
7. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 80-101. It has been asserted that the International
Criminal Court could decide that it has jurisdiction over the 2008-2009 Gaza War without
resolving the question of Palestine statehood. In this Article, I do not address that possibility.
8. John Quigley, The Palestine Declaration to the International Criminal Court: The
Statehood Issue, 35 RUTGERS L. REC. 1 (2009).
9. JOHN QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT (2010).
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community has dealt with Palestine in a way that assumes its statehood,
in particular, by asking it to negotiate borders and, in the case of many
states, by formally recognizing Palestine and establishing diplomatic
relations with it.'0
The pages that follow explain why there is no validity to the points
made by Benoliel and Perry as they seek to challenge my arguments on
Palestine's statehood."
I. ARGUMENT NUMBER ONE: THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S
ACCEPTANCE OF PALESTINE AS A STATE
Benoliel and Perry dispute my position that Palestine's statehood has
been accepted by the international community as represented by the
U.N. General Assembly. They make three points: (1) that my position
reflects the constitutive theory of statehood, a theory they find wanting;
(2) that the U.N. General Assembly in recent years has acted as if Pales-
tine is not in fact a state; and (3) that assertions of Palestine's statehood
made in 1948 and in 2009 are inconsistent with the claim of statehood
on which I rely.12 None of these three points is valid.
A. The Constitutive Theory of Statehood
Benoliel and Perry challenge my assertion that an acknowledgment
of Palestine statehood was reflected in U.N. General Assembly Resolu-
tion 43/177 of December 15, 1988.13 In that resolution the General
Assembly acknowledged the declaration issued in 1988 by the Palestine
National Council, in which the Council asserted Palestine statehood dat-
ing back to the era of the League of Nations.14 Benoliel and Perry say
that my position was based on "a constitutive-state-recognition theoreti-
cal structure," 5 by which they mean the concept that entities become
states only when determined to be such by the international community.
This concept would involve attributing to the General Assembly the role
of determining which entities are states. Other scholars hold to a
10. See generally id.
11. The fact that this reply is limited to Benoliel and Perry's specific references to my
work should not be taken to imply my approval of the analysis contained in the remainder of
their article.
12. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 81.
13. G.A. Res. 43/177, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/177, at 62 (Dec.
15, 1988); Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 81-87.
14. G.A. Res. 43/177, supra note 13; Declaration of Independence, in letter dated Nov.
18, 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/43/827, S/20278 (Nov. 18, 1988).
15. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 81-84.
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so-called declaratory theory of statehood, under which states exist as a
matter of fact, with their recognition-either individually or collec-
tively-not being required. 6
My article, in fact, was not based on any particular theory of rec-
ognition. My position is that, under either theory, Palestine is a state. I
took the approbation of the Palestinian declaration by such a large
number of states as an indication that these states regard Palestine as a
state. Proponents of a declaratory theory may say that Palestine exists
and that these states simply noted that fact. Proponents of a constitutive
theory may say that acceptance of Palestine by so many states made
Palestine into a state. Regardless of which theory about recognition one
holds, the widespread acceptance of Palestine reflected in Resolution
43/177, taken together with further indications of acceptance in subse-
quent years, shows Palestine's statehood.
Benoliel and Perry cite the fact, which is true, that most western Eu-
ropean states did not grant formal diplomatic recognition to Palestine in
the wake of the 1988 Palestinian declaration." They recite, as is also
true, that some of the states that declined to recognize Palestine "did so
on the grounds that they wanted a more definite indication of Palestine's
positive attitude towards Israel, such as an explicit act of recognition of
Israel."" Benoliel and Perry take this reticence to recognize Palestine as
an indication of Palestine's non-statehood. However, they miss the obvi-
ous implication of the position taken by these European states. If a state
says that it will recognize a putative state if the latter takes a particular
action that could be taken at any time, then the former must regard the
latter as a state. Otherwise, it would make no sense to say that it will
recognize statehood upon performance of the desired action. The posi-
tion of these western European states in 1988 and 1989, far from
showing that they did not regard Palestine as a state, shows that they did.
Benoliel and Perry miss the distinction between acknowledgment of
statehood on the one hand, and diplomatic recognition on the other. The
fact that a state does not recognize a putative state through some formal
act of recognition does not necessarily mean that it does not regard the
latter as a state.
Benoliel and Perry find a rejection of Palestine's statehood in a doc-
ument titled "Road Map," adopted on April 30, 2003 by the so-called
Quartet: the Russian Federation, the United States, the European Union,
and the United Nations.'9 Benoliel and Perry assert that the Road Map
16. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 87-88 (5th ed. 1998).
17. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 82.
18. Id. at 82-83.
19. A Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict, in Letter dated May 7, 2003 from the Secretary-General addressed to the
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reflects a negation of Palestine statehood because the Road Map, in their
view, contemplated "two-party negotiations toward Palestinian state-
hood."20 They give no explanation for why they construe the Road Map
to contemplate negotiations toward Palestinian statehood. In fact it does
not. The 1993 Declaration of Principles that provided a framework for
Israel-Palestine negotiations did not call for negotiations about the state-
hood of Palestine, any more than it called for negotiations about the
statehood of Israel.2' Rather, it called for a political accommodation be-
tween the two states.
The 2003 Road Map, moreover, in a clause Benoliel and Perry do
not mention, anticipated recognition of Palestine by the major powers by
the end of 2003 at the latest, if certain conditions were met by the two
parties.22 As matters developed, those conditions were not met, but the
fact that the Quartet anticipated the possibility of early formal recogni-
tion of Palestine makes sense only if the Quartet members considered
there to be a Palestinian state that could be recognized. Hence, the Road
Map, far from negating Palestine's statehood, assumed it.
B. A U.N. General Assembly Retrenchment
on Palestinian Statehood
Benoliel and Perry argue that even if it can be said that the U.N.
General Assembly, by its Resolution 43/177 in 1988, acknowledged Pal-
estine's statehood, the United Nations has subsequently called for a two-
state solution and thus retrenched from its 1988 view. 23 But calling for a
two-state solution does not, as just indicated, imply that Palestine is not a
state.
Any implication that the General Assembly retrenched after 1988 on
Palestine statehood is, moreover, belied by the General Assembly's
action of adopting Resolution 52/250, on July 7, 1998. Benoliel and
Perry omit mention of this resolution. Titled "Participation of Palestine
in the Work of the United Nations," it accorded Palestine a series of
parliamentary privileges that are accorded only to member states of the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/529 (May 7, 2003) [hereinafter Perform-
ance-Based Road Map]; Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 82.
20. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 82.
21. See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, in Letter
dated Oct. 8, 1993 from the Permanent Reps. of the Russian Federation and the United States
of America addressed to the Secretary-General, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/48/486, S/26560 (Oct. 11,
1993) (calling for negotiations on "Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements,
borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and other issues of common inter-
est").
22. See Performance-Based Road Map, supra note 19, at 6 (describing a "Phase Two"
to begin June 2003).
23. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 84-85.
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United Nations, in particular, the right to participate in the general
debate of the General Assembly, and the right to reply to statements
made by delegates of member states.24 Far from retrenching, the General
Assembly was reaffirming its view of Palestine as a state by according it
privileges that the United Nations accords only to U.N. member states.
Benoliel and Perry note the actions in 1989 of the World Health Or-
ganization and the U.N. Economic, Social and Cultural Organization in
deferring action on applications for Palestine's membership in those or-
ganizations. 25 They depict these actions as reflecting "reservations about
the status of Palestine." 26 They fail to mention that the primary reason for
21
the deferral was threats of withdrawal of funding by the United States.
The issue of Palestine's legal status was hardly decisive in the deferrals.28
Moreover, Benoliel and Perry fail to mention other U.N. organs that
routinely treat Palestine as a state. The Security Council lets Palestine
participate in debates at Security Council sessions like any U.N. member
state.2 The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights accords human
rights advisory services to Palestine-services that she is authorized to
accord only to states.30 The Secretary-General has recorded treaties rati-
fied by Palestine-treaties open only to states .
C. Two "Competing" Palestinian Claims to Statehood
Benoliel and Perry argue that the 1988 Palestinian declaration of
statehood is somehow ineffective because of one earlier and one more
recent declaration of Palestinian statehood." The first that they mention
24. G.A. Res. 52/250, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/250 (July
13, 1998).
25. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 85.
26. Id. at 85.
27. QUIGLEY, supra note 9, at 165.
28. Id. at 164-67.
29. U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., 1859th mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV/1 859 (Dec. 4, 1975); see
generally Leo Gross, Voting in the Security Council and the PLO, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 470,
475-79 (1976) (discussing the voting in the Security Council on December 4, 1985 regarding
the proposal to confer on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) a right to participate in
the Security Council's proceedings).
30. G.A. Res. 48/141, 1 4(d), U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/141 (Dec.
20, 1993); OHCHR in Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004-2007), OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/MENARegion/Pages/
PSSummary.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
31. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Agreement on International Roads in the Arab
Mashreq Beirut, May 10, 2001: Palestine: Ratification (Jan. 5, 2007), http://untreaty.un.org/
EnglishICNs/2006/12011300/1275E.pdf ("The Secretary-General of the United Nations,
acting in his capacity as depositary, communicates the following: The above action was ef-
fected on 28 November 2006.").
32. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 85.
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was issued in 1948 by the All-Palestine Government." This entity, based
at the time in Gaza, tried to put in place a governing authority for Pales-
tine as Britain was withdrawing from Palestine and leaving it without a
governing authority.4 The second "competing" claim cited by Benoliel
and Perry dates from 2009 and was issued by an anti-Hamas leader in
Gaza who declared an Islamic republic in Gaza."
Benoliel and Perry suggest that the 1948 and 2009 acts somehow
nullify the 1988 declaration. Why assertions at other times of Palestinian
statehood should negate Palestine's statehood, Benoliel and Perry do not
explain. There is no reason to consider other assertions of Palestinian
statehood as casting doubt on the 1988 assertion.
II. ARGUMENT NUMBER TWo: WHETHER THE PALESTINE STATE
ASSERTED IN 1988 WAS A NEW STATE
Benoliel and Perry attempt to refute my argument that the statehood
asserted by the Palestine National Council in 1988 was not of a new
state, but of a state that already existed. They challenge my position that
Palestine, as a Class A mandate under the League of Nations, was a state
already in that era.36 But beyond a bald assertion, Benoliel and Perry cite
nothing that would demonstrate that Palestine was not a state in the
League era. In particular, they mention nothing of the practice of the
states of that era in regard to Palestine, which is where one must look to
determine if Palestine was then a state. Had Benoliel and Perry exam-
ined that state practice, they would have seen that Palestine was accepted
as a state, even though it was administered by Great Britain under the
mandate system established by the League.37
Most critically, Benoliel and Perry fail to account for a major interna-
tional instrument of the era bearing on the status of Palestine, the 1923
Treaty of Lausanne." It was in this treaty that Turkey gave up its territories
33. Id.
34. Ahmed Hilmi Pasha, Cablegram dated Sep. 28, 1948 from the Premier and Acting
Foreign Secretary of the All-Palestine Government to the Secretary-General Concerning Con-
stitution of All-Palestine Government, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/330 (Oct. 14, 1948), available at
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/62B1867E967323068025648E0041673D.
35. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 86-87.
36. Id. at 87-88.
37. See generally QUIGLEY, supra note 9, at 52-64 (arguing that despite Palestine's
status as a British mandate, Palestinian statehood was reflected in the conclusion of treaties in
the name of Palestine, the regulation of nationality, the representation in proceedings over
inheritance of the Ottoman debt, and the Permanent Court of International Justice's recogni-
tion of Palestine as a state).
38. Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 12.
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in the Arab world following its defeat in World War I9 The Treaty of
Lausanne, to which the World War I allies were party, more than once
refers to Turkey's Arab territories (Iraq, Syria, and Palestine), all of
which became Class A mandates as "states" that were "detached" from
Turkey.40 The Treaty of Lausanne thus reflected an assumption that the
Class A mandate territories, including Palestine, were "states." Under the
League Covenant, the independence of these states was "provisionally
recognized," and they were to be made independent in due course.4 1 The
Class A mandates were states temporarily under the administration of an
outside state.
Had Benoliel and Perry examined relevant League-era sources, they
would have seen that the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
referred to Palestine as a state. This reference came in the well-known
case involving concessions that had been granted to a Greek national
named Mavrommatis by Turkey while it still controlled Palestine.42 The
case raised the issue of the status of those concessions following the de-
mise of the Turkish empire, meaning that the PCIJ needed to determine
what kind of entity had replaced Turkey in the territory of Palestine.43
The Court said that Palestine was a successor state to Turkey.4
Additionally, Palestine was found to be a state in arbitration pro-
ceedings over responsibility for the Ottoman public debt.45 States that
were a party to most favored nation treaties with the United Kingdom
regarded Palestine as a state such that they would benefit from any trade
preference that the United Kingdom accorded to Palestine.46 Further-
more, during the League era, the states of the international community
dealt with Palestine on the basis of its being a state.47 They accepted Pal-
estine passports and concluded treaties with Palestine, even though it
was Britain that negotiated them on Palestine's behalf.48 A distinction
39. Id. art. 16.
40. Id. arts. 30, 46; Protocol Relating to Certain Concessions Granted in the Ottoman
Empire art. 9, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 203.
41. League of Nations Covenant art. 22, para. 4.
42. Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 5, at 7 (Mar. 26).
43. QUIGLEY, supra note 9, at 59; see Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions, 1925
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 5, at 31-32.
44. QUIGLEY, supra note 9, at 59-60; see Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions, 1925
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 5, at 31-32 (noting that Palestine had inherited some of the rights and
obligations of statehood from Turkey).
45. Affaire de la Dette publique ottomane [Ottoman Public Debt Case] (Bulg., Iraq,
Palestine, Transjordan, Greece, It., Turk.), 1 R.I.A.A. 529, 609-10 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1925).
46. QUIGLEY, supra note 9, at 61-64.
47. Id. at 53.
48. Id. at 53-58.
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here was drawn between the power to make treaties, which rested with
Britain, and the capacity to do so, which rested with Palestine.49
Benoliel and Perry concede that the United Nations, by virtue of Ar-
ticle 80 of the U.N. Charter, recognized Palestine's League-era status.o
Article 80 preserves the mandate-derived rights of states and peoples.
Benoliel and Perry challenge, however, the United Nations' "legitimacy"
to recognize Palestine's League-era status. They object that the United
Nations was not the lawful successor to the League of Nations.52 Why the
question of succession as between the League and the United Nations
should matter, they do not explain. What is key here is that the states
forming the United Nations did, via Article 80 of the U.N. Charter, pre-
serve the rights of League-era states, including Palestine's.
III. ARGUMENT NUMBER THREE: STATEHOOD AS AFFECTED BY
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION OF A STATE'S TERRITORY
Moving forward in time to the period following the June 1967 war,
Benoliel and Perry reply to my point that one cannot expect a state to be
in control of its territory if its territory is occupied by the army of a for-
eign state. Benoliel and Perry here assert that independence is required
for statehood, and that a state whose territory is under foreign occupation
is not independent." Their insistence on independence as a prerequisite
for statehood flies in the face of the international practice in the League
era, when, as indicated, the Class A mandates were regarded as states
despite being administered by an outside state.54 But even if independ-
ence were a requirement as a general matter, independence is not
demanded when a territory is occupied, at least if by "independence" one
means the actual ability to control the territory independently from any
other state. A state whose territory is occupied lacks independence in
that sense. By the logic of Benoliel and Perry, Denmark was not a state
while occupied by Germany during World War II.
Benoliel and Perry assert that the supposed independence criterion
for statehood is present only in the event of "the nonexistence of exercise
of power by an alternative state-or even the absence of a right, vested
49. See generally ARNOLD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIEs 36 n.1 (1961) (distinguish-
ing international capacity and treaty-making power).
50. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 90.
51. U.N. Charter art. 80, para. 1.
52. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 90.
53. Id. at 91-92.
54. QUIGLEY, supra note 9, at 42-51.
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in another state, to actualize such governing power."" Here they refer, as
if it were a fact, to "Israel's sovereignty claim over practically most of
the land and key areas in the West Bank with reference to its borders,
airspace and underground water resources."8 Benoliel and Perry extend
Israel's supposed sovereignty claim to the "settlement blocs," to Palestin-
ian land that has been purchased by Israelis, to the old city of Jerusalem,
and to the border with Jordan.
The indicated segments are areas in which Israel may hope to gain
rights under an agreement with Palestine, but Israel has made no claim
of sovereignty, except perhaps with respect to Jerusalem." Israel has de-
nied the applicability in the West Bank of human rights treaties to which
it is a party, on the ground that the West Bank is not under its sover-
eignty.59 Benoliel and Perry in fact concede that Israel's aspirations in
regard to the territory of the West Bank are just that, and not a present
claim to sovereignty, when they refer to "high expectations within Israeli
negotiation teams that portions of the occupied territories in the West
Bank will be ceded to Israel."6
By referring to segments of West Bank territory that may be "ceded"
to Israel in negotiations, Benoliel and Perry impliedly concede not only
that Israel has no present sovereignty claim but that sovereignty rests
with Palestine. Cession of territory is carried out between states. If the
specified territories would be ceded by Palestine, they must presently be
part of Palestine's territory. Otherwise, Israel would not gain them by
cession.
IV. ARGUMENT NUMBER FOUR: ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY
ISRAEL OF PALESTINE'S STATEHOOD
Benoliel and Perry react to my point that Israel, by demanding rec-
ognition from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), as Israel did
in 1993, tacitly acknowledged that the PLO represents a state.6 1 My point
was that recognition is an act carried out between states. If Israel de-
55. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 92. Here Benoliel and Perry rely on JAMES
CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (2d ed. 2006).
56. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 92-93.
57. Id. at 93.
58. Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 34 LSI 209 (1979-1980) (Isr.) (declaring
"Jerusalem, complete and united" to be the capital of Israel).
59. Human Rights Comm., 99th Sess., 2718th mtg., 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.2718
(Aug. 31, 2010) (statement of Ms. Rubinstein (Israel) that Israel's obligations under the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights do not extend to the West Bank or the Gaza
Strip since its obligations apply only in Israel's "national territory").
60. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 94.
61. Id. at 95.
758 [Vol. 32:749
Palestine Is a State
manded recognition of itself as a state, as Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
did of Chairman Yasser Arafat,6 Israel must have deemed the entity from
which it demanded recognition to be the representative of a state. Here,
Benoliel and Perry again raise the constitutive theory of recognition and
claim that my point about recognition is embedded in it.63 Why it matters
on what theory of recognition my point is based they do not make clear.
My point was not in any event based on any particular theory of recogni-
tion. Instead, it was simply that Israel's demand reflected an assumption
on Israel's part that Palestine was a state.
The fact that Israel was making such an assumption was obvious to
Benjamin Netanyahu, who, as an opposition politician in 1993, objected
to Rabin's agreement with Arafat (Declaration of Principles). From the
floor of the Knesset, Netanyahu objected that the mutual recognition that
was part and parcel of the Rabin-Arafat agreement amounted to recogni-
tion by Israel of the Palestine state. The Declaration of Principles,
Netanyahu pointed out, recited that the Government of Israel and the
Palestinian team recognized each other's legitimate and political rights.6
Addressing Rabin directly, Netanyahu asked:
[W]hat are the legitimate and political rights of any nation? A
state. What are the legitimate political rights of the Israeli na-
tion? A state. What are the mutual legitimate political rights with
the Palestinians? A state for them too. And you gave this away
not as a beginning of an agreement, but even before the negotia-
65tions on the permanent arrangements have started.
Netanyahu was correct. Israel had just acknowledged in writing that it
considered Palestine to be a state.
Benoliel and Perry claim that the "crucial actors" in regard to the
question of Palestine statehood are the United States and Israel.6 Why
the question of Palestine statehood lies in the hands of these two states,
they do not explain. The statehood of an entity purporting to be a state is
a matter that involves the interaction of that entity with the international
community generally.
62. See Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the U.N., Letters of Mutual
Recognition (Sept. 9, 1993), http://www.un.int/wcm/content/site/palestine/cache/offonce/
pid/12478;jsessionid=AC4737AF63317142AB1CF82F65E7DBl5 (letter of Arafat to Rabin
recognizing Israel and letter of Rabin to Arafat recognizing the PLO, the latter commitment by
Rabin being made "in the light of the PLO commitments included in your letter").
63. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 95.
64. Opposition Leader Netanyahu Criticizes Agreement with PLO During Knesset
Debate, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTs, Sept. 23, 1993, ME/1801/MED, at 6, avail-
able at LEXIS, News Library, BBCMIR File.
65. Id.
66. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 96.
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Starting from this dubious premise, Benoliel and Perry find a nega-
tion of Palestine's statehood in the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement
of 1995 that set the terms for Palestinian control of some sectors over
which Israel exercised belligerent occupation. 7 They cite the Interim
Agreement's Article 31(7) that says neither side shall change the status
of the West Bank or Gaza Strip during the time that negotiations pro-
ceed.' They take this provision to preclude an assertion of Palestinian
statehood prior to the conclusion of negotiations and claim that any Pal-
estinian assertion of statehood would change the status of the West Bank
and Gaza.69
In fact, an assertion of Palestinian statehood changes nothing, as is
made clear by another provision of the very Article that Benoliel and
Perry cite. They omit mention of the immediately preceding subsection,
Article 31(6). It provides: "Neither Party shall be deemed, by virtue of
having entered into this Agreement, to have renounced or waived any of
its existing rights, claims or positions."o
Palestine's statehood was, of course, declared in 1988, hence Pales-
tinian statehood was a "claim" or a "position" of the Palestinian party to
the Interim Agreement. Palestine's statehood, moreover, as already indi-
cated, was guaranteed by Article 80 of the U.N. Charter, hence
Palestinian statehood was an "existing right."7' Article 31 taken in its
totality in no way prevented an assertion of Palestinian statehood. An
assertion of Palestinian statehood would not change the status of the
West Bank or the Gaza Strip.
V. ARGUMENT NUMBER FIVE: ACCEPTANCE BY ISRAEL OF
THE PROPOSITION THAT PALESTINE IS A STATE
Finally, Benoliel and Perry dispute my position that Israel has tacitly
accepted Palestine as a state by the kinds of interaction it has had with
Palestine.72 In international practice, the acknowledgment of the state-
hood of an entity purporting to be a state is done more often through a
pattern of conduct than through a formal document. Netanyahu well un-
derstood Israel's acceptance of Palestinian statehood, as evidenced by
what he said in the previously mentioned Knesset speech where he be-
rated Rabin for concluding the 1993 Declaration of Principles with
67. Id. at 96 (citing Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Isr.-
P.L.O., Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551 [hereinafter Interim Agreement]).
68. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 96.
69. Id.
70. Interim Agreement, supra note 67, art. XXXI, % 6.
71. See supra Part II.
72. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 97.
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Arafat.7 ' Netanyahu said that the Declaration of Principles presumed
Palestine's statehood. Using a colorful analogy, Netanyahu explained:
When you walk into the zoo and see an animal that looks like a
horse and has black and white stripes, you do not need a sign to
tell you this is a zebra. It is a zebra. When you read this agree-
ment, even if the words a Palestinian state are not mentioned
there, you do not need a sign; this is a Palestinian state.
Netanyahu may not have favored the Declaration of Principles, but he
correctly understood its import. Israel was dealing with Palestine as a
state. Israel was agreeing to negotiate about borders. Borders have mean-
ing only as between states. NGOs do not have borders. National
liberation movements do not have borders. Only states have borders.
Thus, once Israel agreed to negotiate borders, it was accepting the fact
that the party with which it was negotiating represented a state.
Benoliel and Perry suggest that Palestinian officialdom, by entering
into negotiations with Israel, accepted the proposition that Palestine is
not yet a state.7" However, as indicated above, negotiations under the
Declaration of Principles were not to deal with statehood.7 ' Hence, en-
gaging in negotiations carried no implication that Palestinian officialdom
did not regard Palestine as a state. What Palestinian officialdom sought
through the negotiations was a withdrawal of Israel from Palestine's ter-
ritory.
Benoliel and Perry say that the suggestion made in some Palestinian
circles for a "single state" rather than a separate Palestine bespeaks a
negation on the Palestinian side of present Palestine statehood. How-
ever, they never claim that this is a position espoused at the official level
on the Palestinian side. Even if it were, it is always open to a state to
merge with another, given consent on the other side. Hence, espousal of
a single state in the territory of League-era Palestine is not inconsistent
with present Palestinian statehood.
Benoliel and Perry point to episodes in the mid-1990s when Arafat
vowed to declare Palestine's statehood again. They take these episodes to
mean that Palestinian officialdom was speaking of declaring a new state,
hence it did not regard Palestine as then being a state.7 ' However, these
Arafat statements related to reasserting a statehood already declared in
73. Opposition Leader Netanyahu Criticizes Agreement with PLO During Knesset
Debate, supra note 64.
74. Id.
75. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 97.
76. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
77. Benoliel & Perry, supra note 1, at 98.
78. Id. at 99-100.
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1988, and indeed that statehood was indicated in the 1988 declaration as
relating back to the Palestine state of the League era. Hence, Arafat's
statements of the mid-1990s did not reflect an assumption that Palestine
was not a state.
Benoliel and Perry devote considerable attention to the political and
administrative split between the West Bank and Gaza, as if this factor
somehow negates Palestine statehood. They do not indicate how they
consider it relevant, and it is not. The statehood of an entity is not ne-
gated by a split in administration as a result of internal differences.
Benoliel and Perry do raise the possibility that Gaza might be a state of
its own, separate from the West Bank, and they then explain why they
think that it is not. 9 They acknowledge, however, that neither the ad-
ministration of the West Bank nor that of Gaza espouses such a
*80position.
CONCLUSION
The proposition that Palestine is a state may seem strange to some. It
was not so strange to a U.S. district judge who had to decide the issue in
a 1953 case." A man named Kletter was born in Palestine in 1911, when
Palestine was under the control of the Ottoman Turks. As a boy, Kletter
accompanied his mother immigrating to the United States, where she
was naturalized in 1928, thereby conferring U.S. nationality not only on
herself but also on Kletter, then age 17. A few years later Kletter went
back to Palestine, where he was naturalized in 1935. But then he re-
turned to the United States and wanted privileges that would come with
U.S. nationality. 2
Kletter claimed that he was still a U.S. national. He argued that Pal-
estine was not a state, and therefore that his 1935 naturalization there
was invalid. The U.S. district court disagreed. It said that Kletter's natu-
ralization in Palestine was valid, thus he was no longer a U.S. national:
"[N]aturalization in any foreign state ... constitutes expatriation. The
contention of the plaintiff that Palestine, while under the League of Na-
tions mandate, was not a foreign state within the meaning of the statute
is wholly without merit."" In support, the court said that the United
States in 1932 had taken the position that Palestine was a state: "This the
Executive branch of the Government did in 1932," the court explained,
79. Id. at 101-08.
80. Id. at 101.
81. See Kletter v. Dulles, I II F. Supp. 593 (D.D.C. 1953).
82. Kletter, Ill F Supp. at 593-95.
83. Id. at 598.
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"with respect to the operation of the most favored nations provision in
treaties of commerce."84
The court found a reference to the 1932 episode in the State De-
partment's digest of international law, where it is mentioned as
indicating that the United States considered that Palestine was a state.
In 1932, Britain had just enacted comprehensive tariffs on incoming
goods but wanted to exempt goods from Palestine. Britain did not want
to damage the exports of Palestine, as Palestine was under British ad-
ministration. But Britain had a problem; it had treaties with a number of
states, including the United States, that provided that such states were
entitled to the lowest tariff rates Britain charged to any other state. This
was the most favored nation provision to which the court referred. If
Britain allowed goods from Palestine duty-free, the United States, and
indeed a number of other states, including France and Italy, might claim
a similar exemption. The issue turned on whether Palestine was a state.
To test the waters, Britain made discreet diplomatic inquiries to ask
whether, if Britain were to exempt Palestine, the United States would
claim a similar exemption on the basis that Palestine was a state. The
United States replied emphatically that it would. The British govern-
ment was so anxious to exempt Palestine without losing tariff revenue on
goods from the United States and several other states, that it examined
the possibility of suing on the matter in the PCIJ. The British govern-
ment's own legal office advised against suing, however, because the
PCIJ had already said that Palestine was a state that was successor to
Turkey with respect to the territory of Palestine.
Benoliel and Perry tried to refute my position that Palestine is a state
by adducing a great number of arguments. However, nothing they put
forward succeeds. None of the points they make has validity as a matter
of legal analysis. Other authors, also in connection with the declaration
lodged by Palestine in the International Criminal Court, have attempted
to refute Palestine statehood." Some have made the same arguments as
84. Id.
85. Id. at 598 (citing I GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 115 (1940)). The term was "foreign country," since that was the term in the treaty, but
"country" was used as an equivalent of "state."
86. The Secretary of State to the British Charg6 (Osborne) (Aug. 27, 1932), in 2 FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1932, at 32 (1947).
87. See QUIGLEY, supra note 9, at 64; supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the PCIJ case).
88. E.g., Int'l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Palestine: Summary
of Submissions on Whether the Declaration Lodged by the Palestinian National Authority
Meets Statutory Requirements (May 3, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
D3C77FA6-9DEE-45Bl-ACCO-B41706BB41E5/282852/PALESTINEFINAL201010272.pdf
(summarizing submissions supporting and opposing the PLO's declaration on grounds of lack
of statehood).
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Benoliel and Perry. Some have made other arguments. A full assessment
of those arguments can be found in memoranda posted by the Office of
the Prosecutor. A further contretemps on the issue has been posted by
UCLA's Human Rights & International Criminal Law Online Forum.89
Within the confines of this brief reply, the reasons to demonstrate the
existence of Palestinian statehood cannot be fully elaborated. But the
failure of authors who reject Palestinian statehood to find persuasive ar-
guments for their view only reinforces the conclusion that Palestine is a
state.
89. Gaza Jurisdiction Debate-Should the ICC Investigate War Crimes in Gaza?,
UCLA HUMAN RIGHTS AND INT'L CRIMINAL LAw ONLINE FORUM,
http://uclalawforum.com/gaza (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
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